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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between industrial diversification and firm 
valuation in a sample of 816 publicly listed firms in China, and contributes to the literature 
in three ways: First, it provides one of the first few studies on diversification and 
performance in an emerging market dominated by partially privatized firms. Second, it 
explores the determinants of corporate diversification by considering some unique aspects 
of agency and political conflicts inherent in China’s transition towards a market economy. 
Third, it employs an instrumental variable framework to examine the interrelation between 
diversification and firm valuation.  The paper finds that when the decision to diversify is 
modeled as an endogenous choice based on firm characteristics, multi-segment firms have 
significantly higher Tobin’s q than single-segment firms, even after controlling for factors 
such as ownership structure, ownership concentration and growth opportunities. An 
explanation is that non-government controlled firms that perform better and possess more 
cash are more likely to adopt diversification strategies and tend to diversify more.  In 
contrast, government controlled multi-segment firms have lower Tobin’s q than 
non-government controlled multi-segment firms, providing evidence in support of the 
political cost hypothesis of diversification. Overall, our results illustrate that the effect of 
diversification on firm valuation depends on firm’s endogenous choice and the extent of 
government control. 
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1. Introduction 
Diversification is a means by which a firm expands from its core business into other 
product markets and should have no valuation consequence in a Modigliani-Miller world 
(Berry, 1975). Investors should be able to costlessly diversify their portfolios without the 
help of corporate CEOs. But in contrast to the Modigliani-Miller paradigm, large scale 
movements toward greater diversification at certain times and greater focus at other times 
have been witnessed around the globe during the past four decades. 
Various arguments have been put forward to explain why corporations diversify and 
why diversification may affect firm value. One argument is that diversification creates 
value through lower production risks (Amihud and Lev, 1981), larger market power 
(Maksimovic and Philips, 2002), decreased consolidated tax liabilities (Errunza and 
Senbet, 1981) and higher efficiency in resource allocation through internal capital markets 
(Gertner et al., 1994; Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Khanna and Tice, 2001; Matsusaka and 
Nanda, 2002).  Another argument is that diversification destroys value due to 
information asymmetries between CEO and division managers (Meyer et al., 1992; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), conflicts of interest between management and outside 
shareholders (Servaes, 1996; Denis et al., 1997; Aggarwal and Samwick; 2003) and 
inefficient allocation of capital among divisions of diversified firms (Stulz, 1990; Lamont, 
1997; Shin and Stulz, 1998; Rajan et al., 2000).  
Stein (2003) and Martin and Sayrak (2003) provide comprehensive surveys of studies 
on corporate diversification.  The general theme coming from the voluminous literature 
is that empirical research has failed to produce definitive results on diversification and 
firm value. For example, Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) show that the 
valuation discount for U.S. companies ranges between 13% and 54% depending on 
measurement methodologies. However, Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham et al. (2002), 
Schoar (2002) and Villalonga (2004) show that there exists a strong selection bias which 
causes a large fraction of the discount. They use establishment level data to value 
diversified companies and find that the discount can be reduced or turns into a premium. 
Lins and Servaes (1999, 2002) find significant discounts for diversified firms in Japan, the 
United Kingdom and a number of East Asian countries.  Moreover, studies examining 
the valuation impact of mergers suggest that diversification is not a value-destroying event 
(Daley et al., 1997; Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Desai and Jain, 1999). Yet studies of 
corporate refocusing activity and studies imputing multi-segment firm value from 
single-segment proxies suggest that diversification is value-destroying (John and Ofek, 
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1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1996).  Similar seemingly 
contradictory results are often found within a given sample. 
Because there is still no consensus in the literature regarding the valuation 
consequences of corporate diversification, we believe that it is important to continue to 
carefully evaluate the performance of diversifying firms using a variety of samples and 
empirical methodologies. More research is necessary to illustrate if firms located in 
different country environments and institutional contexts gain or lose from diversification. 
Accordingly, we examine whether and to what extent diversification affects performance 
for a sample of 816 partially privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) publicly listed in 
China during 2000 and 2002.  
China offers a unique environment for analyzing diversification and firm performance 
for the following reasons: First, China’s financial markets are less developed and largely 
segmented from the rest of the world.  They are characterized with a lack of reliable 
information and a high degree of information asymmetry, which inevitably leads to a high 
degree of market imperfection. Gertner et al. (1994) and Stein (1997) argue that internal 
capital markets can overcome market imperfections involved in the selection of valuable 
new projects.  Firms with only limited access to external capital can establish internal 
markets to allocate scarce resources within the firm. As a result, there may be a great room 
to increase firm value if a firm creates an internal capital market through diversification. If 
this conjecture is correct, it raises the possibility that the diversification discount for firms 
in the U.S. and other countries with developed capital markets does not automatically 
generalize to countries where external capital is more constrained.  Second, China’s SOE 
reform strategy hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation 
of ownership and control (Su, 2005). Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among 
the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. 
Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or 
even nonexistent ownership stake.  This distinctive shareholding structure creates 
conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) but also between large shareholders and minority investors (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). Moreover, because Chinese government desires to retain some 
control—in part through partial retained ownership of SOEs, further conflicts arise 
between politicians and firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).  Therefore, it is of interest to 
assess whether and to what extent this complex ownership structure affects corporate 
decisions to diversify.  Third, most listed firms in China have a dominant shareholder that 
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helps to shape the strategies and policies of the company. The dominant shareholder can 
exercise substantial control over a firm by way of board representation as well as through 
voting rights.  In many cases it is the central or local government that has the controlling 
stake.  In other cases, the controlling shareholder is a SOE (from which the listed firm 
was carved out) or a private blockholder. The different types of controlling investor may 
have different objectives for the firm. We explore these differences and assess their 
implications for diversification and firm performance. 
Our results provide evidence that the effect of diversification on firm valuation is 
related to ownership structure, government control and firm’s endogenous choice. In 
particular, after controlling for firm-specific factors such as age, size and growth 
opportunities, we find that state and legal entity ownership of shares are negatively related 
to diversification probability and firm valuation.  The relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm valuation is U-shaped, indicating the presence of tunneling and 
expropriation by the controlling shareholder.  Moreover, firms ultimately owned by the 
government are less likely to diversify and perform worse than firms owned by other 
entities. After controlling for the endogeneity of the decision to diversify, multi-segment 
firms are valued significantly higher than single-segment firms. These results complement 
the U.S. and international findings by providing empirical evidence on a country where 
capital markets are less developed and legal protections for minority investors are 
relatively weak.  For all publicly listed firms in China, the benefits of diversification 
appear to dominate its costs.  However, for government controlled firms, where political 
costs of tunneling and expropriation may be high, the benefits of diversification are greatly 
reduced. 
In addition to documenting the effect of diversification on firm valuation in a market 
dominated by partially privatized SOEs, our study contributes to the literature in two other 
important aspects.  First, we test the agency cost hypothesis against the political cost 
hypothesis of diversification using a unique dataset on state and managerial share 
ownerships.  In contrast to the agency cost predictions, we find more evidence in support 
of the political cost predictions as the performance of government controlled diversified 
firms is less than non-government controlled diversified firms.  Second, we demonstrate 
that the link between diversification and firm value is sensitive to firm’s endogenous 
choice.  In particular, after controlling for ownership structure, large shareholder control 
and growth opportunities, we find that diversification has no effect on firm value.  
However, non-government controlled firms that perform better and have more cash are 
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more likely to adopt diversification strategies and tend to diversify more.  To account for 
the potential endogeneity of the decision to diversify, we apply an instrumental variable 
estimation technique and subsequently find that multi-segment firms have significantly 
higher market valuation than single-segment firms.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 contains a brief survey of 
the corporate diversification literature.  Section 3 describes data and the methodology 
used to measure diversification and firm performance.  A number of hypotheses and 
variables are also discussed.  Section 4 presents empirical results regarding the effect of 
diversification on firm performance with and without controls for firm-specific 
characteristics.  Section 5 examines the determinants of diversification decision using 
Logit regression analyses.  Section 6 provides further empirical evidence on the relation 
between diversification and firm performance under an instrumental variable estimation 
framework.  Section 7 concludes with a summary of findings. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The relationship between diversification and firm performance is complex and the 
evidence is mixed. Early evidence seems to indicate that diversification is 
value-destroying while more recent evidence suggests that the valuation effect of 
diversification depends on a number of factors such as the type of diversification, 
corporate governance mechanisms, investment policies, industry structure, market 
environments and sample selection biases. 
 
2.1 Diversification Discounts Documented in the U.S. 
The majority of empirical evidence has indicated that diversified U.S. firms trade at 
discounts compared to single segment firms.1 Lang and Stulz (1994) find that diversified 
firms have significantly lower average and median Tobin’s q than portfolios of specialized 
firms during the period of 1978-1990, suggesting that diversified firms are priced at 
significant discounts.  Berger and Ofek (1995) find that industrial diversification reduces 
                                                        
1 Despite the observed costs arising from corporate diversification, there is theoretical work suggesting that there may 
also be benefits from diversification. For example, Gertner et al. (1994), Stein (1997) and Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) 
suggest that capital constrained firms may establish internal capital markets that are capable of effectively allocating 
scarce resources within the firm.  Hubbard and Palia (1999) find evidence, using acquisitions in the 1960s, that gains 
from diversification are greatest when a financially unconstrained buyer acquires a constrained target. Billett and Mauer 
(2000) infer from their study of tracking stock announcements that there are benefits to diversification.  Using 
anecdotal evidence from Wal-Mart’s entry into the discount business, Khanna and Tice (2001) find that diversified firms 
appear to be quicker in making the market entry or exit decision and their capital expenditures are more sensitive to the 
productivity of the discount business, suggesting that internal capital markets function well. Hyland and Diltz (2002) 
document positive announcement impacts associated with announcements of diversifying events.  
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the market value of multi-segment firms by 13–15% relative to a theoretical value imputed 
from single-segment firms in the same industry between 1986 and 1991. They conclude 
that poorly performing units are subsidized, which contributes to the losses for diversified 
firms.  Comment and Jarrell (1995) present evidence of a clear trend towards corporate 
focusing in the U.S. during the period of 1978 to 1989.  They find that this restructuring 
has had a positive impact on the shareholder value of the refocusing firms.  John and 
Ofek (1995), Daley et al. (1997) and Desai and Jain (1999) examine spinoffs and 
divestitures and find significantly positive long-term performance when firms increase 
their focus through the divestiture of non-core assets.  Denis et al. (2002) find that global 
diversification is associated with a discount comparable in magnitude to the industrial 
diversification discount reported in Berger and Ofek (1995). In addition, firms which are 
both globally and industrially diversified experience an even more pronounced discount. 
One explanation for the above findings is that diversified firms face higher agency 
costs as a consequence of their organizational structure. For example, Servaes (1996) finds 
that insider ownership was negatively related to diversification during the 1960s, a time 
when insider ownership was costly to shareholders. However, when the cost to 
shareholders became negligible, firms with high insider ownership were the first to 
diversify, possibly because insiders wanted to lower their exposure to firm-specific risk.  
Denis et al. (1997) find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial 
and blockholder equity ownership. They argue that agency problems are responsible for 
firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies, and that the trend toward 
increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.  Aggarwal and 
Samwick (2003) find evidence that managers diversify their firms not to reduce their 
exposure to risk but to seek private benefits.  In particular, diversification is positively 
related to managerial incentives, after controlling for firm-specific factors that influence 
diversification decisions.  
Another explanation relies on the argument that diversified firms often invest 
inefficiently.  For example, Shin and Stulz (1998) find that divisional resources depend 
on the performance of their sibling divisions and do not appear to be redirected to the ones 
with the most favorable investment opportunities. Rajan et al. (2000) find that firms with a 
greater dispersion of growth opportunities tend to transfer resources from large divisions 
with good investment opportunities to small divisions with poor investment opportunities. 
Lamont and Polk (2002) find that find that exogenous increases in diversity inferred from 
changes in industry investment levels are negatively related to firm value. Burch and 
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Nanda (2003) analyze changes in excess values resulting from corporate spinoffs and 
conclude that conglomerate discounts can be attributed to diversity in divisional 
investment opportunities in general. 
 
2.2 Evidence on the Illusory Nature of the Diversification Discounts 
A growing body of the literature suggests that the evidence on the so-called 
“diversification discount” does not necessarily imply that diversification per se destroys 
value. Diversification may be beneficial or, at the minimum, not value-destroying. For 
example, Chevalier (2000) analyzes the investment behavior of a sample of firms before 
and after diversifying mergers and finds no evidence of a change in investment behavior.  
She argues, therefore, that inefficient investment in diversified firms may be due to 
cross-section differences between the segments of diversified firms and single-segment 
firms.  Mansi and Reeb (2002) claim that industrial diversification decreases risk and 
increases bondholder value. They find strong evidence that the market value of debt is 
positively related to diversification.  
More recently, a number of studies suggest that the observed discounts may be the 
cause rather than the consequence of diversification or the discount may be a statistical 
artifact arising from measurement errors or sample selection biases. For example, Whited 
(2001) argue that miscalculation of Tobin’s q can explain the evidence on the inefficient 
allocation of capital reported in Shin and Stulz (1998).  Graham et al (2002) show that 
target firms in diversifying mergers have been discounted by the capital markets prior to 
the merger announcements and the acquisition of firms with poor investment opportunities 
explains the value loss. They further demonstrate that using industry-median market 
values from single-segment firms to impute the value of diversified firms may produce a 
spurious discount.  Campa and Kedia (2002) show that diversification decision is 
endogenously determined by a firm along with other policies and characteristics, and that 
diversification discount drops or disappears when the endogeneity of the diversification 
decision is controlled for. Villalonga (2004) identifies a self-reporting bias in the industrial 
segment data from COMPUSTAT and uses he Business Information Tracking Series 
(BITS) as an alternative data source.  She finds that diversified firms with business units 
defined according to the BITS data trade at a premium relative to specialized firms. 
Most of the above studies highlight the difficulties involved in attempting to precisely 
measure the valuation effect of diversification. Other recent research focused at the plant 
level finds that conglomerates may not be less productive than single-segment firms of 
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similar size. For instance, Schoar (2002) examines the effects of industrial diversification 
on production efficiency using total factor productivity (TFP) and finds that diversified 
firms are more productive than single-segment firms but firms that acquire plants in 
unrelated industries experience a subsequent decrease in TFP.  Using plant-level data 
from the U.S. manufacturing firms, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) find that less 
productive firms are more likely to diversify, but diversification does not cause lower 
productivity.  They argue that firms optimally choose to diversify and endogenous 
changes in diversification have a positive effect, reflecting firms moving closer to the 
optimum.  
  
2.3 International Evidence 
While diversification may have limited value in a developed economy such as the 
U.S., it may be more valuable for firms in other economies where it is costly or impossible 
to raise external capital, either because of imperfect information or incomplete capital 
markets. For example, Lins and Servaes (1999) document a diversification discount for 
Japan and the United Kingdom of about 10% and 15%, respectively.  However, they are 
unable to determine a discount for German firms.  They explain the non-existence of a 
discount in Germany with the concentrated ownership structure of insiders that leads to 
higher firm values. Claessens et al. (1999) find diversification discounts for firms in more 
developed East Asian economies and diversification premiums in less developed 
economies.  Focusing on diversified business groups in India, Khanna and Palepu (2000) 
find that larger diversified groups that are in a better position to tap external capital 
outperform smaller unaffiliated firms, providing some indirect support for the hypothesis 
that the value of diversification depends critically on the level of capital market 
development and integration.  However, Lins and Servaes (2002) argue that the 
less-developed financial and legal regimes in emerging markets increase the potential 
agency costs associated with diversification and that greater information asymmetry 
allows insiders to exploit minority shareholders more easily. Consistent with these 
arguments, they find that diversified firms in 7 East Asian countries (Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand) trade at a discount of 
approximately 7% compared to single-segment firms. 
Using a database of more than 8,000 companies from 35 countries, Fauver et al. (2003) 
find that the value of diversification is negatively related to the level of capital market 
development, international integration and legal systems, suggesting that diversification 
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may be more valuable in emerging markets than in more developed economies. Fauver et 
al. (2004) provide further evidence that a country’s legal system and the ownership 
structure of the firm affect the value of diversified firms.   
Therefore, the international evidence regarding the valuation effect of corporate 
diversification is still quite limited. The connection between diversification and firm 
performance continues to generate substantial interest among financial theorists and 
practitioners. In this paper, we intend to add on to the existing literature by examining 
whether and to what extent diversification affects performance of Chinese firms.  More 
specifically, we assemble a unique data set that consists of 816 partially privatized firms 
listed in the two securities exchanges in China during 2000 and 2002, and test whether the 
gain or loss from diversification depends on firm’s endogenous choice and the institutional 
context of ownership structure and shareholder control. 
 
3. Data, Variables and Hypotheses 
3.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample spans the time period between 2000 and 2002 and initially includes all 
926 firms going public before January 1, 2000.  Firms are considered as diversified 
(multi-segment) if they operate in more than one CSRC (China Securities Regulatory 
Commission) two-digit code industries and none of their segments accounts for more than 
90% of total sales.  Single-segment firms are those with at least 90% of total sales 
derived from one single CSRC two-digit code industry.  We exclude 6 financial firms 
because their liabilities are not strictly comparable to those in other industries.  In 
addition, we eliminate 26 firms that have subsequently been persecuted for violation of 
Securities Law or undergone investigation for corporate fraud by the CSRC.  Out of the 
remaining 894 firms, 78 firms have missing sales data for their segments during 2000 and 
2002.  As a result, our final sample consists of 816 firms from 74 two-digit industries 
with a total of 2448 firm-years.  Data on segment sales are compiled from financial 
statements publicly available on the web (www.jrj.com and www.cnlist.com).  Data on 
stock price and accounting information are extracted from China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database commercially available from University of 
Hong Kong and Shenzhen GTA Information Co. Ltd. 
3.2 Measures of Diversification and Firm Performance 
In measuring the diversification variable, two alternative proxies are constructed.  
The first measure of diversification is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm engages in 
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industrial diversification as defined in Section 3.1, and 0 otherwise (DIV). The second 
measure is a sales-based Herfindahl index (HI) defined as follows: 
∑ ∑= ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
M
j j ij
ij
i SALES
SALES
HI
1
2
,
,                          (1) 
where tjSALES ,  is the sales revenue for segment j in firm i.  HI equals 1 for 
single-segment firms and decreases as the degree of diversification increases. 
 In measuring firm performance, we employ an accounting-based and a stock 
market-based proxy.2  The accounting-based performance measure is return on sales 
(ROS), defined as the ratio of operating income to sales revenue. 3   The stock 
market-based valuation measure is Tobin’s q, estimated as the sum of market value of 
equity and the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets (Chung 
and Pruitt, 1994).4  
 Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics and correlation matrix for diversification, 
firm performance and other control variables (described in subsequent sections).  As 
shown in the table, the median sales-based Herfindahl index decreases from 0.958 in 2000 
to 0.907 in 2002, indicating that the degree of diversification has increased over time.  
The average ROS and Tobin’s q decreases from 26.7% and 2.738 in 2000 to 23.7% and 
1.748 in 2002, respectively, providing strong evidence that firm performance has 
deteriorated over the sample period.  In addition, HI is negatively correlated with Tobin q 
(statistically significant at the 5% level for all three years) and ROS (statistically 
significant in 2000 and 2001), presenting some evidence that diversification is associated 
with better firm performance.  
                                                        
2 We do not use the excess value method proposed by Berger and Ofek (1995) because there is practical limitation in 
securing the median ratios from representative firms in the same lines of business as there are often only a few 
stand-alone firms available in the same industry.  Moreover, Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham et al. (2002) and 
Villalonga (2004) suggest that the Berger and Ofek’s method causes a possible downward bias in computing firm value. 
3 Sun and Tong (2003) point out that China’s regulatory rules allow listed companies to have rights issue up to 30% of 
outstanding stocks annually. Many firms take advantage of this rule to raise additional equity capital even if they have no 
investment opportunities. Total equity and total asset would increase dramatically in such cases, which poses major 
problems in using the common profitability measures such as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). 
Consequently, ROS is a better profitability and performance measure. 
4 In calculating the market value of equity, we notice that almost two-thirds of total outstanding shares are in the form of 
non-tradable state and legal entity shares.  As a result, we multiply the non-tradable shares by the net asset value per 
share and add the figure to the market capitalization of tradable shares. 
6 State shares are retained by the State Assets Management Bureau (SAMB) of the central or local government and are 
not allowed to be publicly traded, although reforms have been initiated to free up these shares since May 2005. Legal 
entity shares are held by domestic institutional investors including banks, securities companies, insurance companies, 
mutual funds, industrial enterprises, transportation and power companies, and research institutes.  Similar to state 
shares, legal entity shares are not tradable and most of them are ultimately controlled by the state through its control over 
the legal entities. Public shares are held by the investment public and tradable on the two securities exchanges. 
Employee shares are offered to workers and managers of a listed firm, typically at substantial discounts, at the time of 
initial public offerings (IPOs). 
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3.3 Ownership Structure 
During the sample period covered in this study, the ownership structure of China’s 
listed firms can be classified into four main categories: state shares, legal entity shares, 
publicly tradable shares and employee shares.6 A number of research has documented that 
because of complex agency problems and soft budget constraints, state ownership is 
negatively related to firm performance and firm value in China (see Xu and Wang, 1999; 
Sun and Tong, 2003; Aivazian et al., 2005; Wei et al., 2005; among others). Therefore, we 
include the percentage of shares held by the government (STATE) to and hypothesize that: 
[H1] State ownership is negatively related to firm valuation.   
In addition, Sun and Tong (2003) point out that unlike the government, many legal 
entities have close business connections with the listed firms in which they have 
ownership.  Compared with either the government or individual shareholders, legal 
entities have more expert knowledge of the firm and are better equipped with the power to 
monitor management.  Consequently, legal entity ownership is tied to better firm 
performance. However, it is also quite possible that legal entity shareholders may 
expropriate assets or cash flows from the listed firms.  As a result, the impact of legal 
entity share ownership (LEGAL) on firm performance is an interesting empirical question 
to be addressed in this paper.  
Moreover, Jensen (1986) argues that firms where managerial ownership is high tend 
to have shareholders’ and managers’ interests better aligned and, therefore, suffer less 
agency costs.  Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) provide evidence 
of a predominantly positive relation between corporate value and managerial ownership. 
With respect to the relation between diversification and agency costs, Denis et al. (1997) 
find that managerial ownership of shares is an important determinant of corporate 
diversification.  Lins and Servaes (2002) argue that the severe market imperfections 
found in emerging markets increase the potential agency costs associated with 
diversification and that greater asymmetric information allows management and large 
shareholders to exploit minority shareholders more easily through value-reducing 
diversification. Nam et al. (2006) find that firms with high equity-based compensation 
have higher valuation than firms with low equity-based compensation, which is true in 
both single-segment and multi-segment firms. The effect of equity-based compensation 
for multi-segment firms, where agency costs are expected to be higher, is much greater 
than for single-segment firms. Therefore, we include the percentage of shares held by 
managers and directors (MHOLD) and hypothesize that: 
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[H2] Managerial equity ownership is positively related to firm valuation. 
[H3] The performance sensitivities of managerial equity ownership are larger for 
diversified firms than for single-segment firms (agency cost hypothesis of diversification). 
 
3.4 Ownership Concentration 
Consistent with existing literature, we measure ownership concentration as the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder (LARGE).  In theory, a controlling 
shareholder can affect minority shareholders’ rights and firm performance in two opposite 
ways.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large shareholders can benefit minority 
shareholders because they have the power and incentive to prevent expropriation or asset 
stripping by managers.  On the other hand, large shareholders can collude with managers 
to expropriate minority shareholders’ benefits, which is called “tunneling” (Johnson et al., 
2000) and described as one of the central agency problems in countries with relatively 
poor shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000).  Therefore, the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance is an empirical question.  When 
ownership of shares is widely dispersed, increasing ownership concentration is likely to 
mitigate the free-rider problem amongst shareholders and increase firm efficiency.  
However, when the fractional ownership of the largest shareholder exceeds a certain 
threshold, increasing ownership concentration raises the likelihood of tunneling and 
decreases firm efficiency.  As ownership concentration approaches 100%, the tunneling 
effect diminishes and the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
efficiency becomes positive again.  In light of the institutional background in China, i.e., 
ownership of share is almost never widely dispersed and there is usually one 
overwhelmingly large shareholder with controlling power in the listed firms, we 
hypothesize that the last two effects dominate in the data, i.e., 
[H4] The relationship between ownership concentration and firm valuation is 
U-shaped. 
Because government can extend its ownership and control through pyramidal 
shareholding scheme, it is a key player in the operational management of firms.  Su 
(2005) argues that the Chinese government may pursue objectives that are at odds with the 
interests of other shareholders through tunneling activities (political costs).  For example, 
the government can exert considerable influence on the selection of managers and board 
directors and thus, can persuade the management to engage in value-destroying spin-offs 
and divert assets from the listed firm to the state. Government bureaucrats can also run a 
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diversified firm like their own personal fiefdom, dispensing patronage in the form of jobs 
and favors. Therefore, we introduce a dummy variable GOV and interact it with DIV to 
examine the effect of the identity of ultimate owners on diversification and firm 
performance.  GOV takes the value 1 if the government is the ultimate owner and 0 
otherwise. We hypothesize that: 
[H5] Government control is negatively related to firm valuation. 
[H6] The performance of government controlled diversified firms is worse than that of 
non-government controlled diversified firms (political costs hypothesis of diversification). 
 
3.5 Value of Internal Capital Markets 
Billett and Mauer (2000) argue that the credit constraints of the internal capital 
markets affect conditions under which internal capital market transactions are 
value-enhancing.  They use the sum across segments of the product of each segment’s 
excess capital expenditures and its industry-adjusted return on investment to proxy for the 
value of the internal capital markets, and find that diversification discount is negatively 
correlated with cross-subsidies to segments of a diversified firm that would likely be credit 
constrained as stand-alone firms. Because data on excess capital expenditures at the 
segment level are not available in the Chinese case, we use two variables to access the 
credit constraints governing a firm’s decision to engage in diversification activities. The 
first one is the sum of operating profits and cumulative depreciation divided by total assets 
(CASH), which is a proxy for the ease of credit condition for a firm to engage in 
cross-subsidization.  The second one is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm declares 
cash dividend in a given year (DD)7.  We hypothesize that: 
[H7] Firms that are less credit-constrained are more likely to diversify. 
 
3.6 Growth Opportunities  
If diversified firms have fewer growth opportunities than average single-segment 
firms, they would have lower values relative to their industry average.  In addition, 
certain specialized firms are characterized by the need for large amounts of firm-specific 
knowledge that is not easily transferable to other lines of business. Hyland and Diltz (2002) 
control for firm-specific knowledge and growth opportunities by including a measure of 
research and development (R&D) intensity. They find that diversifying firms invest less in 
                                                        
7 Lang and Stulz (1994) argue that a firm which pays dividends could invest more by cutting dividends, 
and hence is unlikely to be credit-constrained in financial markets. 
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R&D and have significantly fewer growth opportunities than single-segment firms prior to 
diversification. However, Stowe and Xing (2006) measure growth opportunities with the 
ratio of capital expenditures to total assets and find that differing growth opportunities 
between diversified and single-segment firms cannot account for the diversification 
discount. Because data on R&D expenses are not available for China’s listed firms, we use 
the percentage change in total assets (GROWTH) and the ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets (INTANG) to proxy for growth opportunities and control for the valuation effect of 
diversification that is attributable to firm-specific knowledge.  We also follow Campa 
and Kedia (2002) in including the fraction of all firms in the industry that are 
conglomerates (IND) to proxy for the attractiveness of the industry to multi-segment firms.  
We hypothesize that: 
[H8] Firms with better growth opportunities performance better and are more likely 
to engage in value-enhancing diversification. 
[H9] Industry attractiveness is positively related to diversification. 
 
3.7 Other Control Variables 
Firm size is a positive predictor of firm diversification in that larger firms have greater 
propensity to be diversified. Thus, we employ the logarithm of total assets (LNSIZE) to 
control for the size effect.  In addition, Stein (2003) posits that the rise and decline of 
corporate diversification may be due to the production life cycle of the firm. Because 
many firms in China carve out their most profitable assets and businesses into a joint stock 
company for the IPO in order to raise capital in the stock market, we use the the number of 
years after going public (AGE) to control for the age effect. Furthermore, Matsusaka and 
Nanda (2002) and Doukas and Pentzalis (2003) show that diversified firms can utilize 
internal capital markets to overcome the difficulty in access to external finance. Therefore, 
we include the ratio of book value of debt to the sum of the book value of debt and market 
value of equity (LEVER) as a control variable.8  Moreover, we include a separate dummy 
variable for each of the 13 single-digit CSRC industries for all firms in the sample. 
                                                        
8 Ahn et al. (2006) argues that leverage constrains investment in that firms with valuable growth 
opportunities would choose lower leverage to avoid the risk of being forced to bypass some of these 
opportunities.  They find that within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment 
is significantly greater for high-growth than for low-growth segments.  They also find that after 
controlling for excess leverage (actual leverage minus imputed leverage based on the methodology 
proposed by Berger and Ofek, 1995), the difference between the excess values of diversified and 
focused firms is large and statistically significant for high-growth firms while it is insignificant for 
low-growth firms.  As mentioned in Section 3.2, we are constrained by the data to compute excess 
values.  Nevertheless, we include leverage ratio as a control variable. 
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4. Preliminary Evidence on the Effect of Diversification on Firm Performance 
Table 3 provides mean, standard deviation and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for 
our sample divided into single- and multi-segment firms. As shown in the table, the 
average Tobin’s q for multi- and single-segment firms is 2.2245 and 2.0947, respectively.  
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample t-statistic for the difference in sample means is 
2.7198 and significant at the 1% level, indicating that diversified firms are valued more by 
the market. However, the difference in ROS between multi- and single-segment firms is 
not statistically significant. In terms of ownership structure, multi-segment firms have 
significantly lower state and managerial ownership but higher legal entity share ownership.  
In terms of ownership concentration, both the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder and the likelihood of government as the ultimate owner are smaller for 
multi-segment firms. In terms of the value of internal capital markets and growth 
opportunities, multi-segment firms have higher cash flow, asset growth and intangible 
assets, and operate in more attractive industries, but distribute less cash dividends than 
single-segment firms.  These results are largely consistent with the hypotheses that firms 
with less credit constraints or better growth opportunities are more likely to diversify.  
However, diversified firms are more levered, which is inconsistent with the notion that 
leverage is negatively related to diversification.  Finally, multi-segment firms are older 
but their average firm size is not significantly different from single-segment firms.   
Table 4 partitions the sample along two dimensions, multi-segment versus 
single-segment and government controlled versus non-government controlled, for 
measures of firm performance and other characteristics.  The mean and standard 
deviation of the four sub-samples are contained in cells with heavy border line.  For each 
variable, the top two cells are for government controlled firms, partitioned by whether or 
not firms are diversified.  The lower two cells are for non-government controlled firms, 
also partitioned by diversification.  Surrounding these four cells are the Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov two sample t-statistics that test for the differences in sample means for the rows, 
columns and diagonals.  Consistent with table 3, on average, multi-segment firms have 
higher Tobin’s q than single-segment firms, but the difference in sample means is 
statistically significant for non-government controlled firms only. 9  In comparison, 
non-government controlled firms have significantly higher Tobin’s q than government 
                                                        
9 In subsequent sections, we demonstrate that non-government controlled firms, which are better 
performers, are more likely to take up diversification. 
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controlled firms, no matter whether they are diversified. These results suggest that 
government control may exert an important influence on whether or not diversification 
enhances firm value. 
In addition, table 4 shows that the non-government controlled multi-segment firms 
have significantly higher ROS than state-owned single-segment firms.  Furthermore, an 
examination of the table indicates that non-government controlled firms have significantly 
higher managerial equity ownership, growth opportunities and cash flow, and operate in 
more attractive industries than government controlled firms.  After controlling for the 
identity of the ultimate owner, multi-segment firms always have higher leverage, asset 
growth, cash flow, intangible assets and industry attractiveness than single-segment firms.  
These results are consistent with those in table 3.  However, government controlled 
multi-segment firms have significantly higher managerial equity ownership than 
government controlled single-segment firms while non-government controlled 
multi-segment firms have significantly lower managerial equity ownership than 
non-government controlled single-segment firms, suggesting that government control may 
be an important determinant of insider ownership. 
To provide an initial investigation of the impact of diversification on firm valuation, 
we estimate the following multivariate panel data regressions: 
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where tiq ,  is Tobin’s q for firm i in year t, tiDIV ,  and tiHI ,  are diversification dummy 
and sales-based Herfindahl index, respectively, tiLARGE2 ,  is the squared term for 
tiLARGE ,  to allow for the nonlinear effect of ownership concentration on firm performance, 
titi MHOLDDIV ,, ×  is the interaction term of diversification dummy and managerial 
ownership to test for the agency cost hypothesis of diversification [H3], and titi GOVDIV ,, ×  
is the interaction term of diversification and government control to test for the political cost 
hypothesis of diversification [H6]. 
 Table 5 presents panel regression estimates and their associated p-values based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. An inspection of the table reveals several 
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interesting features on the effect of diversification on firm value.  First, multi-segment 
firms have higher Tobin’s q than single-segment firms after controlling for firm age and 
size, as the coefficient estimate for DIV is significantly positive while the coefficient 
estimate for HI is significantly negative, both at the 5% level in columns (i) and (iv).10  
However, after controlling for the identity of ultimate owners, the coefficient estimate for 
HI is no longer significant, while the coefficient estimate for DIV remains significantly 
positive at the 10% level.  The differences in Tobin’s q between multi- and 
single-segment firms become much smaller and statistically insignificant after controlling 
for ownership structure, managerial incentives, large shareholder control, growth 
opportunities and other firm-specific characteristics. 
Second, in contrast to the agency cost prediction in [H2], managerial equity 
ownership is negatively related to Tobin’s q as the coefficient estimates for MHOLD are 
significantly negative in columns (iii) and (vii). An explanation is that executive shares, 
which are part of the employee share ownership program, are not tradable without explicit 
permission from the CSRC.  Thus, ownership of equity shares creates no performance 
incentives for managers and board directors.  Moreover, there is no evidence that the 
performance sensitivities of managerial equity ownership are larger for diversified firms, 
where agency costs are expected to be higher, as none of the coefficient estimates for the 
MHOLDDIV ×  interaction term is statistically significant. Therefore, the agency cost 
hypothesis of diversification [H3] can be firmly rejected in our data. 
 Third, consistent with hypothesis [H5], there is strong evidence that government 
control decreases Tobin’s q as the coefficient estimates for GOV are all significantly 
negative.  There is also some evidence that government controlled diversified firms have 
lower Tobin’s q than non-government controlled diversified firms, as the coefficient 
estimates for the GOVDIV ×  are significantly negative at the 10% level in column (iii) 
and marginally significantly negative in column (vii). This result suggests that the effect of 
diversification on firm performance depends on the extent of government control and that 
the political cost prediction in hypothesis [H6] cannot be rejected, at least in model 
specifications (iii) and (vii). Therefore, an explanation for the insignificance of the 
coefficient estimates for DIV in regressions (iii)—(iv) and HI in regressions (vi)—(viii) is 
that government control, which is associated with inferior firm performance, reduces the 
positive impact of diversification on Tobin’s q. 
                                                        
10 Note that a higher Herfindahl index implies greater concentration (i.e., lower diversification). Thus the negative 
coefficient on HI is consistent with the positive coefficient on DIV. 
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 In addition to providing important evidence on the effect of diversification on firm 
value, the results in Table 5 reaffirm a number of empirical findings documented in earlier 
studies on ownership structure, block-holder control and firm performance for China’s 
listed firms.  Consistent with Wei et al. (2005) and hypothesis [H1], we find that state and 
legal entity ownership are negatively related to Tobin’s q.  The magnitude of the negative 
impact of legal entity ownership slightly exceeds that of state ownership, indicating that 
the destruction of firm value by the legal entity shareholders is very serious.  In line with 
Bai et al. (2004) and hypothesis [H4], the coefficient estimates for LARGE and LARGE2 
are significantly positive and negative, respectively, which suggests that the relationship 
between ownership concentration and Tobin’s q is U-shaped.  Therefore, tunneling and 
expropriation by the controlling shareholder appears to be an important issue to be further 
addressed in the ongoing corporate governance reform in China.  Finally, smaller or older 
firms with higher annual asset growth rates have significantly larger Tobin’s q while 
intangibles exert no impact on firm value. 
 
5. The Determinants of Corporate Diversification Decisions 
As discussed in Section 2, recent studies have shown that the valuation effect from 
diversification may be the product of sample selection bias or firm’s endogenous choice 
and that diversification per se may not destroy or add value to the firm. Therefore, it is 
very important to examine whether certain characteristics inherent in firms are likely to 
affect diversification decisions.  
In this section, the diversification decision is presented as a dependent variable. The 
probability to diversify is estimated with a set of explanatory and control variables which 
may influence a firm’s decision to operate as a single- or multi-segment firm. Specifically, 
we estimate the following Logit regression using maximum likelihood estimation: 
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where DIVtiP ,  is the probability that firm i will engage in diversification activities in year t. 
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The independent variables include lagged firm value, ownership structure, ownership 
concentration, the identity of the controlling shareholder, lagged leverage, lagged cash 
constraints, lagged growth potentials, stock exchange dummy (EX takes the value 1 when 
the firm is listed in the Shanghai Securities Exchange, and 0 if it is listed in the Shenzhen 
Securities Exchange), age, size and industry.  For sensitivity tests, we re-estimate 
regression (3) by replacing lagged Tobins’s q with 1, −tiROS . As a result of our use of a 
number of lagged one-year variables, our sample size is reduced from 2448 to 1632 
firm-year observations. 
 Table 6 reports transformed coefficient estimates representing the marginal effects 
evaluated at the sample means of the independent variables from the Logit regression. The 
marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected 
value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.  The 
equation statistics at the bottom of the table, i.e., Maddala’s pseudo 2R , McFadden’s 
pseudo 2R  and the likelihood ratio tests, measure the goodness-of-fit of the estimated 
model. The null hypothesis that the model does not have greater explanatory power than 
an “intercept only” model, is overwhelmingly rejected at the 1% significance level. 
 As shown in the table, the marginal effect estimates for lagged Tobin’s q are 
significantly positive at the 5% level while those for lagged ROS are positive but 
statistically insignificant, providing some evidence that firms with better past valuation are 
more likely to adopt diversification strategies.  Consequently, any further attempt to shed 
more light on the effect of diversification on firm value has to take into consideration the 
endogeneity issue between diversification and valuation measures.   
In addition, the marginal effect estimates for STATE and LEGAL are all significantly 
negative, indicating that firms with higher state or legal entity share ownerships are less 
likely to diversify. The transformed coefficient estimates for GOV are also significantly 
negative, mostly at the 5% level, indicating that government controlled firms are less 
likely to diversify. Thus, consistent with the political cost hypothesis, government 
ownership and control play an important role in understanding diversification behavior 
and firm performance, at least for partially privatized firms in China.  In contrast, the 
agency cost hypothesis may not be able to explain diversification decisions, as the 
marginal effect estimates for MHOLD, the variable representing managerial incentive, are 
statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, the results in Table 6 indicate that hypotheses [H7], [H8] and [H9] 
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cannot be rejected. More specifically, the marginal effect estimates for CASH are 
significantly positive at the 1% level and the marginal effect estimates for DD are negative 
but statistically insignificant, indicating that firms with more operating profits plus 
cumulative depreciation are more likely to diversify while firms’ policy on cash dividend 
distribution is unrelated to diversification decisions.  Hence, consistent with hypothesis 
[H7], there is some evidence that firms with less cash constraints are more likely to 
diversify.  The marginal effect estimates for GROWTH are significantly positive at the 
1% level and the marginal effect estimates for INTANG are also positive but statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that diversification probability is positively related to asset 
growth while unrelated to the fraction of intangible assets.  Thus, there is some evidence 
in favor of hypothesis [H8] that firms with better growth opportunities are more likely to 
diversify.  The marginal effect estimates for IND are significantly positive at the 5% level, 
providing evidence that industry attractiveness is positively related to the diversification 
probability (hypothesis [H9]).   
Finally, the results in Table 6 shows that firm age is positively related to the 
diversification decisions, which is consistent with the life-cycle proposition in Stein 
(2003).  On the other hand, both leverage and firm size are unrelated to diversification as 
the transformed coefficient estimates for LEVER and LNSIZE are never statistically 
significant. 
 
6. Diversification and Firm Performance: A Closer Look 
In the previous section, we assume that the decision to operate as a multi-segment 
firm is a function of past performance, firm characteristics and industry.  In this section, 
we allow diversification choice and firm performance to be endogenous outcomes based 
on firm characteristics.  In the spirit of the methodology proposed by Campa and Kedia 
(2002), we apply an instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique to isolate the 
influence of diversification on firm performance from the influence of other firm-specific 
characteristics. Specifically, we first estimate the probability of being a multi-segment 
firm from the following Logit model, using the whole sample of 2448 firm-year 
observations:11 
                                                        
11 Compared with Logit regression (3), the independent variables in (4) are all contemporaneous and do not include firm 
performance.  Firm-specific instruments, such as CASH, DD, IND and EX, are assumed to affect firm performance only 
through making diversification more or less likely. 
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 We then use the estimated probability of diversification DIVtiP ,ˆ  as an instrument for 
the diversification status and include it along with a number of exogenous variables as 
explanatory variables in the following regression of the decision to diversify: 
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Lastly, we use the fitted value from regression (5) as an instrument for tiDIV ,  in the 
following regression of firm performance on diversification: 
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To test for the existence of endogeneity between diversification and firm performance, 
we compute the Hausman’s test statistics, which is based on the difference between the 
OLS estimator and the IV estimator. To test for the robustness of the results, we substitute 
ROS for Tobin’s q as dependent variable and replicate regression (6). We also replace 
tiDIV ,  with tiHI ,  and tiVID ,ˆ  with tiIH ,ˆ  and re-estimate regressions (5) and (6).  
Table 7 contains the IV estimates of the effect of diversification on firm valuation. 
As shown in the table, the null hypothesis of no endogeneity can be rejected at the 
1% level, indicating that endogeneity is present in the data. The coefficient estimates for 
tiVID ,ˆ  are significantly positive at the 5% level while the coefficient estimates for tiIH ,ˆ  
are significantly negative at the 1% level, suggesting that diversification is associated with 
higher firm value, even after controlling for ownership structure, ownership concentration, 
the identity of ultimate owners and growth opportunities.  In contrast to the results in 
Table 5, the Tobin’s q for multi-segment firms is on average 0.26 to 0.33 higher than that 
of single-segment firms, after correcting for the endogeneity problem. Moreover, a 0.1 
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decrease in sales-based Herfindahl index leads to a 0.22 to 0.27 increase in Tobin’s q, 
suggesting that a higher degree of diversification is associated with higher firm value. 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates for MHOLD and MHOLDDIV ×  are positive 
but statistically insignificant, indicating that managerial share ownership does not affect 
firm value and there is no difference in performance sensitivities for managerial incentives 
among multi- and single-segment firms.  Consequently, the agency cost hypothesis of 
diversification can be firmly rejected.  However, the coefficient estimates for GOV are 
significantly negative at the 5% level in regressions (ii) and (iv) and at the 10% level in 
regressions (i) and (iii), indicating that government controlled firms have lower Tobin’s q 
than non-government controlled firms.  The coefficient estimates for GOVDIV ×  are 
significantly negative at the 10% level in regressions (i) and (iii), providing some evidence 
that government-controlled multi-segment firms have lower Tobin’s q than government 
controlled single-segment firms.  The implication is that government ownership of firms 
is associated with significant value loss for diversified firms.  Therefore, the political cost 
hypothesis of diversification cannot be rejected. 
Furthermore, consistent with the results in Table 5, firms with higher asset growth 
rates have larger Tobin’s q as the coefficient estimates for GROWTH are significantly 
positive at the 1% level.  However, most of the coefficient estimates for STATE, LEGAL 
and LARGE are no longer statistically significant, indicating that ownership structure and 
block shareholder control play very limited role in affecting firm value, after taking into 
account the endogeneity of the decision to diversify. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes corporate diversification and firm performance of partially 
privatized state-owned enterprises in China as they reflect conflicts among government’s 
desire to retain political control, private investors’ desire for return on their investments, 
and management’s desire to appropriate resources for its own benefit. The paper thus 
sheds additional light on the benefits and costs of diversification in corporate China. The 
main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows: 
First, managerial incentive does not appear to be significantly related to firm 
performance and there is no evidence that the performance sensitivities of managerial 
equity ownership are larger for diversified firms, where agency costs are expected to be 
higher.  However, there is some evidence that government controlled diversified firms 
have lower Tobin’s q than non-government controlled diversified firms, suggesting that 
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the effect of diversification on firm value varies according to whether a firm is controlled 
by the government.  Therefore, the empirical results are against the agency cost 
predictions while in favor of the political cost hypothesis of diversification. 
Second, a firm’s diversification decision is not random and depends on past 
performance, ownership structure, government control, growth potential and the value of 
internal capital markets. Specifically, non-government controlled firms that have higher 
Tobin’s q and possess more cash are more likely to adopt diversification strategies and 
tend to have a higher degree of diversification.  
Third, when the diversification decision is modeled as an endogenous choice based 
on firm characteristics, multi-segment firms have significantly higher Tobin’s q than 
single-segment firms, even after controlling for factors such as ownership structure, 
ownership concentration and growth opportunities. Overall, the results in this paper 
indicate that diversification has positive impact on firm valuation in a country where the 
external capital market is less developed and the diversification effect is largely influenced 
by political control and firm’s endogenous choice. 
Although the paper obtains some interesting results, two issues remain.  One is that 
the intricate relation between diversification and the efficiency of the internal capital 
market is left unexplored due to a lack of detailed accounting data at the segment level. 
Another is that the empirical analysis does not consider the interactive effects of leverage 
and growth opportunities on diversification and firm value as the main objective is to 
differentiate agency cost predictions from political cost hypothesis of diversification. We 
hope to explore these unresolved issues more fully in future research.
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 Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for Diversification, Firm Performance and Other 
Variables 
 
 Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DIV A dummy variable that takes one if a firm engages in diversification and 0 otherwise 0.5993 0.4901 0 1 
HI Sales-based Herfindahl index 0.7983 0.2353 0.167 1 
Tobin’s q Market value of equity plus book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets 2.1725 1.0471 0.933 22.339
ROS The ratio of operating income to sales revenue 0.2519 0.1487 -0.872 0.909 
STATE The percentage of shares held by the State Asset Management Bureau 0.3459 0.2641 0 0.85 
LEGAL The percentage of shares held by legal entities 0.2471 0.2522 0 0.864 
MHOLD The percentage of shares held by top executives (managers and directors) 0.0007 0.0053 0 0.149 
LARGE The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder 0.4544 0.1747 0.032 0.886 
GOV A dummy variable that takes 1 if government is the ultimate owner of the firm 0.5846 0.4929 0 1 
LEVER The ratio of book value of debt to the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity 0.4262 0.1615 0.012 0.878 
DD A dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm distribute cash dividend in a given year 0.6311 0.4826 0 1 
GROWTH The percentage change in total assets 0.3010 1.0170 -0.826 22.283
CASH The sum of operating profits and cumulative depreciation divided by total assets 0.1800 0.1425 -0.256 1.369 
IND The number of diversified firms divided by the total number of firms in an industry  0.5948 0.2088 0 1 
INTANG The ratio of intangible assets to total assets 0.0429 0.0605 0 0.811 
AGE The number of years after going public 5.4203 2.4681 1 13 
LNSIZE The logarithm of the total assets 21.0485 0.7909 18.748 23.689
The sample consists of 816 firms from 74 two-digit CSRC industries during the period of 2000 to 2002 
with a total of 2448 firm-years. 
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Table 2:  Correlation Matrix for Diversification, Firm Performance and Other 
Variables 
  HI Tobin’s q ROS GOV STATE LEGAL LARGE MHOLD
-0.7003 0.0607 0.0175 -0.1058 -0.1474 0.087 -0.1958 -0.018
DIV [0.0000] [0.0026] [0.3877] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.3738] 
-0.0884 -0.086 0.1712 0.1592 -0.0953 0.2104 0.0028 
HI   [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.8883] 
0.1329 -0.1541 -0.0779 0.0412 -0.1352 0.0489 
Tobin’s q    [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0415] [0.3865] [0.0155] 
-0.0095 -0.0174 -0.1199 -0.0746 0.0255 
ROS     [0.6371] [0.3882] [0.0000] [0.0002] [0.2076] 
0.3795 -0.3499 -0.1947 -0.0615 
GOV      [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0023] 
-0.8677 0.4529 -0.0656 
STATE       [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0012] 
-0.1742 0.0421
LEGAL        [0.0000] [0.0373] 
       -0.0336 LARGE        [0.0969] 
         
  LEVER GROWTH CASH IND INTANG AGE LNSIZE 
0.1043 0.0253 0.2765 0.4191 0.1169 0.1711 -0.0427 
DIV [0.0000] [0.2104] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0348]  
-0.083 -0.023 -0.2501 -0.3607 -0.1114 -0.1072 0.0641  
HI [0.0000] [0.2557] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0015]  
-0.0981 0.1565 0.0005 0.06 0.0152 -0.1613 -0.3642  
Tobin’s q [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.9793] [0.0030] [0.4535] [0.0000] [0.0000]  
0.0546 0.0217 0.2286 0.0631 0.1783 -0.0908 -0.0497  
ROS [0.0069] [0.2827] [0.0000] [0.0018] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0140]  
0.0022 -0.109 -0.0893 -0.098 -0.0315 0.0126 0.0555  
GOV [0.9134] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.1187] [0.5334] [0.0060]  
0.0053 0.0133 -0.1421 -0.1425 -0.161 -0.1657 0.1222  
STATE [0.7923] [0.5093] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]  
-0.0383 -0.0175 0.0178 0.1206 0.1282 0.0137 -0.1502  
LEGAL [0.0583] [0.3860] [0.3782] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.4987] [0.0000]  
-0.13 -0.0635 -0.3271 -0.2147 -0.1601 -0.2522 0.1841  
LARGE [0.0000] [0.0017] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]  
-0.0495 0.0146 -0.032 0.0211 -0.0191 -0.0585 -0.028  
MHOLD [0.0143] [0.4690] [0.1139] [0.2966] [0.3461] [0.0038] [0.1666]  
0.0666 -0.2737 0.1107 0.0168 0.2326 0.1707  
LEVER   [0.0010] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.4072] [0.0000] [0.0000]  
-0.0308 0.0576 -0.0114 -0.1974 0.0384  
GROWTH    [0.1272] [0.0044] [0.5728] [0.0000] [0.0578]  
0.3291 0.1397 0.1863 0.1667  
CASH     [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]  
0.1575 0.1541 -0.0232  
IND       [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.2515]  
0.1202 -0.1204  
INTANG       [0.0000] [0.0000]  
0.0847  
AGE        [0.0000]  
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Table 3:  Comparison of Single- and Multi-segment Firms 
 
Multi-segment 
Firms 
Single-segment 
Firms  Variable 
Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
 Mean Difference 
(t-statistic) 
Tobin’s q 2.2245 1.4117 2.0947 1.1587 0.1298*** (2.7198) 
ROS 0.2540 0.1665 0.2487 0.1573 0.0053 (0.9112) 
STATE 0.3140 0.2527 0.3935 0.2555 -0.0794*** (-8.4001) 
LEGAL 0.2650 0.2308 0.2203 0.1960 0.0447*** (4.7560) 
MHOLD 0.0006 0.0016 0.0008 0.0050 -0.0002* (-1.8013) 
LARGE 0.4259 0.2482 0.4958 0.2658 -0.0699*** (-7.1381) 
GOV 0.5419 0.4684 0.6483 0.4386 -0.1064*** (-6.9092) 
LEVER 0.4400 0.2485 0.4056 0.2238 0.0344*** (3.8253) 
DD 0.6033 0.4805 0.6728 0.4438 -0.0695*** (-4.3578) 
GROWTH 0.2325 0.3742 0.2008 0.3085 0.0317*** (3.0918) 
CASH 0.2282 0.1561 0.1478 0.1102 0.0804*** (17.3291) 
IND 0.6663 0.3622 0.4878 0.2619 0.1785*** (14.8078) 
INTANG 0.0487 0.0561 0.0343 0.0363 0.0144*** (9.8358) 
AGE 5.7655 3.4410 4.9042 2.7995 0.8613*** (7.3897) 
LNSIZE 21.0209 10.3198 21.0897 10.3509 -0.0688 (-0.1649) 
Number of 
Observations 1467 981  
***, ** and * denote a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% for a two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
two sample t-test, respectively. 
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Table 4:  Comparison of Government controlled versus Non-government controlled 
and Single-segment versus Multi-segment Firms 
 Multi-segment Firms 
Single-segment 
Firm 
 
Government-owned 2.0569 (1.0499) 2.0110 (0.9456) Row Test: 0.0459 [1.38] 
Non-government 2.4228 (1.3340) 2.2490 (0.8830) Row Test: 0.1737*** [4.98] Tobin’s q 
Diagonal Test: 
-0.4118*** [-11.10] 
Column Test:  
-0.3659*** [-9.32] 
Column Test: 
-0.2380*** [-8.31] 
Diagonal Test: 
-0.1921*** [-6.26] 
Government-owned 0.2532 (0.1422)  0.2475 (0.1379) Row Test: 0.0056 [1.25] 
Non-government 0.2549 (0.1378) 0.2508 (0.1013) Row Test: 0.0042 [1.11] ROS 
Diagonal Test: 
-0.0074* [-1.69] 
Column Test:  
-0.0019 [-0.39] 
Column Test:  
-0.0033 [-0.88] 
Diagonal Test: 
0.0024 [0.61] 
Government-owned 0.0004 (0.0008)  0.0003 (0.0005) Row Test: 0.0001*** [3.61] 
Non-government 0.0008 (0.0014) 0.0016 (0.0050) Row Test: -0.0008***[-7.45] MHOLD 
Diagonal Test:  
-0.0004*** [-14.41] 
Column Test:  
-0.0004*** [-10.94] 
Column Test: 
-0.0012*** [-11.91] 
Diagonal Test: 
-0.0011*** [-11.12] 
Government-owned 0.4430 (0.2243) 0.4059 (0.1961) Row Test: 0.0371*** [5.32] 
Non-government 0.4364 (0.2143) 0.4051 (0.1538) Row Test: 0.0313*** [5.37] LEVER 
Diagonal Test: 
-0.0305*** [-4.56] 
Column Test:  
0.0066 [0.90] 
Column Test:  
0.0008 [0.1469] 
Diagonal Test: 
0.0379*** [6.24] 
Government-owned 0.1921 (0.2313) 0.1590 (0.1585) Row Test: 0.0331*** [5.65] 
Non-government 0.2803 (0.3100) 0.2778 (0.2707) Row Test: 0.0025 [0.30] GROWTH 
Diagonal Test:  
-0.1213*** [-16.80] 
Column Test:  
-0.0882*** [-10.94] 
Column Test:  
-0.1188*** [-18.43] 
Diagonal Test: 
-0.0857*** [-11.69] 
Government-owned 0.2218 (0.1039) 0.1357 (0.0787) Row Test: 0.086***[30.68] 
Non-government 0.2317 (0.1317) 0.1580 (0.0989) Row Test: 0.074***[19.97] CASH 
Diagonal Test: 
-0.0960*** [-28.37] 
Column Test:  
-0.0098*** [-2.72] 
Column Test:  
-0.0223*** [-7.85] 
Diagonal Test: 
0.0638*** [20.48] 
Government-owned 0.6531 (0.3252) 0.4831 (0.2267) Row Test: 0.1700*** [18.34] 
Non-government 0.6820 (0.3239) 0.4965 (0.1865) Row Test: 0.1855*** [22.54] IND 
Diagonal Test: 
-0.1989*** [-21.83] 
Column Test:  
-0.0289*** [-2.66] 
Column Test: 
-0.0134** [2.06] 
Diagonal Test: 
0.1566*** [18.78] 
Government-owned 0.0472 (0.0454) 0.0340 (0.0304) Row Test: 0.0131*** [11.39] 
Non-government 0.0506 (0.0388) 0.0348 (0.0219) Row Test: 0.0158*** [16.93] INTANG 
Diagonal Test: 
-0.0165*** [-15.79] 
Column Test:  
-0.0034*** [-2.64] 
Column Test:  
-0.0008 [-0.9741] 
Diagonal Test: 
0.0124*** [11.81] 
 
Figures in cells with heavy border lines are sample means and figures in parentheses are standard 
deviations.  The null hypothesis that the difference in sample means is zero is tested using a two-tailed 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two sample t-test.  The differences in sample means are reported in row tests, 
column tests and diagonal tests and figures in brackets are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote a 
significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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 Table 5:  Panel Regression Estimates of the Effect of Diversification on Firm Value 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
11.057*** 11.060*** 12.584*** 12.746*** 11.208*** 11.170*** 12.636*** 12.791***CONST 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.082**  0.062* 0.029 0.021      
DIV 
(0.024) (0.084) (0.588) (0.697)     
    -0.174** -0.109  -0.069  -0.066 
HI 
    (0.032) (0.166) (0.343)  (0.377) 
  -0.322**    -0.318**  
STATE 
  (0.016)    (0.017)  
  -0.389**    -0.385**  
LEGAL 
  (0.015)    (0.015)  
   -1.806***    -1.793***
LARGE 
   (0.003)    (0.003) 
   1.948***    1.940***
LARGE2 
   (0.002)    (0.002) 
  -2.709** -2.084    -2.726** -2.069 
MHOLD 
  (0.048) (0.131)   (0.044) (0.126) 
  42.635 46.286    42.741  46.182 DIV 
? MHOLD   (0.240) (0.199)   (0.236) (0.197) 
 -0.245*** -0.092** -0.089**  -0.244*** -0.095*** -0.088***
GOV 
 (0.000) (0.029) (0.027)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.007) 
  -0.072* -0.052    -0.064  -0.051 DIV 
? GOV   (0.087) (0.158)   (0.106) (0.187) 
  1.167*** 1.177***   1.167*** 1.178***
GROWTH 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
  -0.190  -0.135    -0.192  -0.138 
INTANG 
  (0.504) (0.622)   (0.498) (0.615) 
-0.015  -0.013  0.017* 0.024* -0.014  -0.013  0.017* 0.024* 
AGE 
(0.219) (0.277) (0.083) (0.059) (0.245) (0.304) (0.078) (0.057) 
-0.424*** -0.420*** -0.503*** -0.506*** -0.423*** -0.420*** -0.502*** -0.506***
LNSIZE 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2R  0.286  0.298  0.544  0.546  0.286  0.305  0.551  0.552  
 
This table contains fixed effect estimates of panel regressions of Tobin’s q on diversification. Tobin’s q is the market 
value of equity plus the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets, DIV is the diversification 
dummy, HI is the sales-based Herfindahl index, STATE is the percentage of shares held by the government, LEGAL is 
the percentage of shares held by legal entities, MHOLD is the percentage of shares held by top executives (managers and 
directors), LARGE is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder, LARGE2 is the squared term for LARGE, 
GOV is a dummy variable that takes 1 if government is the ultimate owner of the firm, GROWTH is the percentage 
change in total assets, INTANG is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, AGE is the number of years after going 
public, and LNSIZE is the logarithm of the total assets. Figures in parentheses are p-values for 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6:  Logit Regression Estimates of the Determinants of Diversification Decision 
 (i) (ii) (vii) (viii) 
0.188** 0.189**   Tobin’s q (-1) 
(0.023) (0.022)   
  0.212 0.211 
ROS (-1) 
  (0.709) (0.712) 
-1.193**  -1.214**  
STATE 
(0.033)  (0.028)  
-1.204**  -1.245**  
LEGAL 
(0.041)  (0.033)  
 -0.526  -0.564* 
LARGE 
 (0.114)  (0.091) 
-0.164 -0.146 -0.162 -0.145 
MHOLD 
(0.534) (0.566) (0.533) (0.565) 
-0.261** -0.250** -0.274** -0.272** 
GOV 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.017) (0.011) 
-0.199 -0.304 -0.211 -0.321 
LEVER (-1) 
(0.673) (0.519) (0.658) (0.502) 
-0.109 -0.106 -0.081 -0.079 
DD (-1) 
(0.480) (0.491) (0.595) (0.605) 
0.561*** 0.567*** 0.640*** 0.644*** 
GROWTH(-1) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.376*** 0.391*** 0.382*** 0.397*** 
CASH (-1) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.365 0.402 0.331 0.350 
INTANG (-1) 
(0.759) (0.733) (0.780) (0.765) 
0.419 0.413 0.377 0.371 
IND (-1) 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
0.140*** 0.151*** 0.132*** 0.143*** 
AGE 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.016 0.015 -0.108 -0.075 
LNSIZE 
(0.878) (0.882) (0.256) (0.429) 
Maddala's pseudo 2R  0.222 0.220 0.222 0.220 
McFadden's pseudo 2R  0.187 0.185 0.186 0.184 
LR 615.894 (0.000) 
608.982 
(0.000) 
614.110 
(0.000) 
607.269 
(0.000) 
This table contains transformed coefficient estimates representing the marginal effects evaluated at the sample means of 
the independent variables from the Logit regression. The marginal effect of a dummy variable is calculated as the 
discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. The 
dependent variable is the diversification dummy (DIV). Tobin’s q is the market value of equity plus the book value of 
total debt divided by the book value of total assets, ROS is the ratio of operating income to sales revenue, STATE is the 
percentage of shares held by the government, LEGAL is the percentage of shares held by legal entities, MHOLD is the 
percentage of shares held by top executives (managers and directors), LARGE is the percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholder, GOV is a dummy variable that takes 1 if government is the ultimate owner of the firm, LEVER is the 
ratio of book value of debt to the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity, DD is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if a firm distribute cash dividend in a given year GROWTH is the percentage change in total assets, CASH is the 
sum of operating profits and cumulative depreciation divided by total assets, INTANG is the ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets, IND is the number of diversified firms divided by the total number of firms in an industry, AGE is the 
number of years after going public, and LNSIZE is the logarithm of the total assets.  (-1) denotes lagged variable of one 
year.  LR is the likelihood test statistic for the goodness-of-fit of the model.  Figures in parentheses are p-values. ***, 
** and * denote a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 7:  Instrumental Variable Regression Estimates of the Effect of Diversification 
on Firm Performance 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
1.6966*** 1.9420*** 3.2052*** 3.2487*** CONST 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.3272** 0.2625**   
VID ˆ  (0.0266) (0.0406)   
  -2.6808*** -2.1514*** 
IHˆ    (0.0000) (0.0148) 
-0.1837  -0.1622  
STATE (0.5387)  (0.5466)  
-0.3256*  -0.3347*  
LEGAL (0.0920)  (0.0869)  
 -0.8347*  -0.8090 
LARGE  (0.0918)  (0.1060) 
 0.4845  0.7460 
LARGE2 
 (0.2627)  (0.1108) 
0.0078 0.0093 0.0084 0.0084 
MHOLD (0.9558) (0.5547) (0.7414) (0.7881) 
0.3988 0.3840 0.3964 0.3762 
DIV ? MHOLD (0.2874) (0.3007) (0.2873) (0.3083) 
-0.0659* -0.0849** -0.0689* -0.0827** 
GOV 
(0.0956) (0.0252) (0.0913) (0.0292) 
-0.0647* -0.0426 -0.0769* -0.0499 
DIV ? GOV (0.0983) (0.2589) (0.0791) (0.1988) 
1.0781*** 1.0707*** 1.0826*** 1.0764*** 
GROWTH (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
0.3452 0.3461 0.0804 0.1789 
INTANG 
(0.3163) (0.3059) (0.8195) (0.6232) 
2R  0.440 0.421 0.442 0.426 
Hausman Test 
(p-value) 
34.852 
(0.000) 
31.108 
(0.000) 
26.446 
(0.000) 
22.693 
(0.000) 
 
This table contains coefficient estimates of regression of Tobin’s q on instruments of diversification. Tobin’s q is the 
market value of equity plus the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets, VID ˆ  is the fitted 
value of the diversification dummy from a regression of DIV on the estimated probability to diversify and a set of 
exogenous variables, IHˆ  is the fitted value of the sales-based Herfindahl index from a regression of HI on a set of 
exogenous variables, STATE is the percentage of shares held by the government, LEGAL is the percentage of shares held 
by legal entities, MHOLD is the percentage of shares held by top executives (managers and directors), LARGE is the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder, LARGE2 is the squared term for LARGE, GOV is a dummy variable 
that takes 1 if government is the ultimate owner of the firm, GROWTH is the percentage change in total assets and 
INTANG is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets.  Figures in parentheses are p-values for 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
